Inter-groups information exchange drives Cooperation in the Public Goods Game

Abstract

In this manuscript we explore the onset of cooperative traits in the Public Goods game. This well-known game involves N-agent interactions and thus reproduces a large number of social scenarios in which cooperation appears to be essential. Many studies have recently addressed how the structure of the interaction patterns influences the emergence of cooperation. Here we study how information about the payoffs collected by each individual in the different groups it participates in, influences the decisions made by its group partners. Our results point out that cross-information plays a fundamental and positive role in the evolution of cooperation for different versions of the Public Goods game and different interaction structures.

8 pages, 4 figures

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Cited by in corpus (1)

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