Evolutionary Dynamics of Group Formation

Abstract

We introduce a model, based on the Evolutionary Game Theory, for studying the dynamics of group formation. The latter constitutes a relevant phenomenon observed in different animal species, whose individuals tend to cluster together forming groups of different size. Results of previous investigations suggest that this phenomenon might have similar reasons across different species, such as improving the individual safety (e.g. from predators), and increasing the probability to get food resources. Remarkably, the group size might strongly vary from species to species, and sometimes even within the same species. In the proposed model, an agent population tries to form homogeneous groups. The homogeneity of a group is computed according to a spin vector, that characterizes each agent, and represents a set a features (e.g. physical traits). We analyze the formation of groups of different size, on varying a parameter named 'individual payoff'. The latter represents the gain one agent would receive acting individually. In particular, the agents choose whether to form a group (receiving a 'group payoff'), or if to play individually (receiving an 'individual payoff'). The phase diagram representing the equilibria of our population shows a sharp transition between the 'group phase' and the 'individual phase', in correspondence of a critical 'individual payoff'. In addition, we found that forming (homogeneous) small groups is easier than forming big groups. To conclude, we deem that our model and the related results supports the hypothesis that the phenomenon of group formation has evolutionary roots.

13 pages, 5 figures

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• Homophily-based social group formation in a spin-glass self-assembly framework
• Mobility driven coexistence of living organisms
• Model for clustering of living species
• Assortative clustering in a one-dimensional population with replication strategies