When greediness and self-confidence meet in a social dilemma
arXiv:2307.04044 · doi:10.1016/j.physa.2023.129033
Abstract
A greedy personality is usually accompanied by arrogance and confidence. This work investigates the cooperation success condition in the context of biased payoff allocation and self-confidence. The first component allows the organizer in a spatial public goods game to receive a different proportion of goods than other participants. The second aspect influences the micro-level dynamics of strategy updates, wherein players can maintain their strategy with a certain weight. Analytical results are obtained on square lattices under the weak selection limit. If the organizer attempts to monopolize the public goods, cooperation becomes more attainable. If the confidence increases, cooperation is inhibited. Consequently, these elements have conflicting effects on cooperation, and their simultaneous presence can result in a heterogeneous change of the critical synergy factor. Our theoretical findings underscore the subtle implications of a mutual trait that may manifest as greediness or self-confidence under different circumstances, which are validated through Monte Carlo simulations.
15 pages, 7 figures, accepted for publication in Physica A
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- Evolution of cooperation and competition in multilayer networks
- Evolution of trust in structured populations