activity
20162020
most citedRole-separating ordering in social dilemmas controlled by topological frustration

46 citations · 46 across the 1 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators

6 papers

physics.soc-ph2020

Skepticism and rumor spreading: the role of spatial correlations

Marco Antonio Amaral, W. G. Dantas, Jeferson J. Arenzon

Critical thinking and skepticism are fundamental mechanisms that one may use to prevent the spreading of rumors, fake-news and misinformation. We consider a simple model in which a…

physics.soc-ph2020

Strategy equilibrium in dilemma games with off-diagonal payoff perturbations

Marco A. Amaral, Marco A. Javarone

We analyse the strategy equilibrium of dilemma games considering a payoff matrix affected by small and random perturbations on the off-diagonal. Notably, a recent work [1] reported…

physics.soc-ph2020

Heterogeneity in evolutionary games: an analysis of the risk perception

Marco A. Amaral, Marco A. Javarone

In this work, we analyse the relationship between heterogeneity and cooperation. Previous investigations suggest that this relation is nontrivial, as some authors found that hetero…

q-bio.PE2019

Moderate death rates can be beneficial for the evolution of cooperation

Elton Júnior. S, Marco A. Amaral, Lucas Wardil

Spatial structure is one of the simplest and most studied ecological factors that affect the evolution of cooperation. It has been shown that spatial reciprocity promotes cooperati…

physics.soc-ph201746 cited

Role-separating ordering in social dilemmas controlled by topological frustration

Marco A. Amaral, Matjaz Perc, Lucas Wardil +3

"Three is a crowd" is an old proverb that applies as much to social interactions, as it does to frustrated configurations in statistical physics models. Accordingly, social relatio…

physics.soc-ph2016

Evolutionary mixed games in structured populations: Cooperation and the benefits of heterogeneity

Marco A. Amaral, Lucas Wardil, Matjaz Perc +1

Evolutionary games on networks traditionally involve the same game at each interaction. Here we depart from this assumption by considering mixed games, where the game played at eac…