Random Topologies and the emergence of cooperation: the role of short-cuts
arXiv:1010.3547 · doi:10.1088/1742-5468/2011/04/P04019
Abstract
We study in detail the role of short-cuts in promoting the emergence of cooperation in a network of agents playing the Prisoner's Dilemma Game (PDG). We introduce a model whose topology interpolates between the one-dimensional euclidean lattice (a ring) and the complete graph by changing the value of one parameter (the probability p to add a link between two nodes not already connected in the euclidean configuration). We show that there is a region of values of p in which cooperation is largely enhanced, whilst for smaller values of p only a few cooperators are present in the final state, and for p \rightarrow 1- cooperation is totally suppressed. We present analytical arguments that provide a very plausible interpretation of the simulation results, thus unveiling the mechanism by which short-cuts contribute to promote (or suppress) cooperation.
References in corpus (11)
- Evolutionary games on graphs
- Cooperation and Contagion in Web-Based, Networked Public Goods Experiments
- Enhancement of cooperation in highly clustered scale-free networks
- Effect of spatial structure on the evolution of cooperation
- Spatial prisoner's dilemma optimally played in small-world networks
- Evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma on heterogeneous Newman-Watts small-world network
- Randomness enhances cooperation: a resonance type phenomenon in evolutionary games
- Evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma game on the Newman-Watts networks
- Social Dilemmas and Cooperation in Complex Networks
- Coevolution of strategies and update rules in the Prisoner's Dilemma game on complex networks
- The Future of Social Experimenting
Cited by in corpus (6)
- Evolution of emotions on networks leads to the evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas
- Evolution of gossip-based indirect reciprocity on a bipartite network
- Lying on networks: The role of structure and topology in promoting honesty
- Cooperation driven by success-driven group formation
- Social Pressure and Environmental Effects on Networks: A Path to Cooperation
- Organization of cooperation in fractal structures