Eco-Evolutionary Dynamics of Bimatrix Games

Abstract

Feedbacks between strategies and the environment are common in social-ecological, evolutionary-ecological, and even psychological-economic systems. Utilizing common resources is always a dilemma for community members, like tragedy of the commons. Here we consider replicator dynamics with feedback-evolving games, where the payoffs switch between two different matrices. Although each payoff matrix on its own represents an environment where cooperators and defectors can't coexist stably, we show that it's possible to design appropriate switching control laws and achieve persistent oscillations of strategy abundance. This result should help guide the widespread problem of population state control in microbial experiments and other social problems with eco-evolutionary feedback loops.

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Cited by in corpus (5)

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• Evolutionary game selection creates cooperative environments
• Restoring spatial cooperation with myopic agents in a three-strategy social dilemma
• Shaping the learning signal in a combined Q-learning rule to improve structured cooperation