Coevolution of relationship and interaction in cooperative dynamical multiplex networks

Abstract

While actors in a population can interact with anyone else freely, social relations significantly influence our inclination towards particular individuals. The consequence of such interactions, however, may also form the intensity of our relations established earlier. These dynamical processes are captured via a coevolutionary model staged in multiplex networks with two distinct layers. In a so-called relationship layer the weights of edges among players may change in time as a consequence of games played in the alternative interaction layer. As an reasonable assumption, bilateral cooperation confirms while mutual defection weakens these weight factors. Importantly, the fitness of a player, which basically determines the success of a strategy imitation, depends not only on the payoff collected from interactions, but also on the individual relationship index calculated from the mentioned weight factors of related edges. Within the framework of weak prisoner's dilemma situation we explore the potential outcomes of the mentioned coevolutionary process where we assume different topologies for relationship layer. We find that higher average degree of the relationship graph is more beneficial to maintain cooperation in regular graphs, but the randomness of links could be a decisive factor in harsh situations. Surprisingly, a stronger coupling between relationship index and fitness discourage the evolution of cooperation by weakening the direct consequence of a strategy change. To complete our study we also monitor how the distribution of relationship index vary and detect a strong relation between its polarization and the general cooperation level.

arXiv comment11 two-column pages, 6 figures, to be published in Chaos

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