Supervised cooperation on interdependent public goods games
arXiv:2412.10873 · doi:10.1016/j.amc.2024.129249
Abstract
It is a challenging task to reach global cooperation among self-interested agents, which often requires sophisticated design or usage of incentives. For example, we may apply supervisors or referees who are able to detect and punish selfishness. As a response, defectors may offer bribes for corrupt referees to remain hidden, hence generating a new conflict among supervisors. By using the interdependent network approach, we model the key element of the coevolution between strategy and judgment. In a game layer, agents play public goods game by using one of the two major strategies of a social dilemma. In a monitoring layer, supervisors follow the strategy change and may alter the income of competitors. Fair referees punish defectors while corrupt referees remain silent for a bribe. Importantly, there is a learning process not only among players but also among referees. Our results suggest that large fines and bribes boost the emergence of cooperation by significantly reducing the phase transition threshold between the pure defection state and the mixed solution where competing strategies coexist. Interestingly, the presence of bribes could be as harmful for defectors as the usage of harsh fines. The explanation of this system behavior is based on a strong correlation between cooperators and fair referees, which is cemented via overlapping clusters in both layers.
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