Information sharing promotes prosocial behaviour
arXiv:1308.3485 · doi:10.1088/1367-2630/15/5/053010
Abstract
More often than not, bad decisions are bad regardless of where and when they are made. Information sharing might thus be utilized to mitigate them. Here we show that sharing the information about strategy choice between players residing on two different networks reinforces the evolution of cooperation. In evolutionary games the strategy reflects the action of each individual that warrants the highest utility in a competitive setting. We therefore assume that identical strategies on the two networks reinforce themselves by lessening their propensity to change. Besides network reciprocity working in favour of cooperation on each individual network, we observe the spontaneous emerge of correlated behaviour between the two networks, which further deters defection. If information is shared not just between individuals but also between groups, the positive effect is even stronger, and this despite the fact that information sharing is implemented without any assumptions with regards to content.
14 pages, 7 figures; accepted for publication in New Journal of Physics
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