The Rock--Paper--Scissors Game
arXiv:1903.05991 · doi:10.1080/00107514.2015.1026556
Abstract
Rock-Paper-Scissors (RPS), a game of cyclic dominance, is not merely a popular children's game but also a basic model system for studying decision-making in non-cooperative strategic interactions. Aimed at students of physics with no background in game theory, this paper introduces the concepts of Nash equilibrium and evolutionarily stable strategy, and reviews some recent theoretical and empirical efforts on the non-equilibrium properties of the iterated RPS, including collective cycling, conditional response patterns, and microscopic mechanisms that facilitate cooperation. We also introduce several dynamical processes to illustrate the applications of RPS as a simplified model of species competition in ecological systems and price cycling in economic markets.
Mini-review article. 28 single-column pages
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