Testability of evolutionary game dynamics models based on experimental economics data

Abstract

Understanding the dynamic processes of a real game system requires an appropriate dynamics model, and rigorously testing a dynamics model is non-trivial. In our methodological research, we develop an approach to testing the validity of game dynamics models that considers the dynamic patterns of angular momentum and speed as measurement variables. Using Rock-Paper-Scissors (RPS) games as an example, we illustrate the geometric patterns in the experiment data. We then derive the related theoretical patterns from a series of typical dynamics models. By testing the goodness-of-fit between the experimental and theoretical patterns, we show that the validity of these models can be evaluated quantitatively. Our approach establishes a link between dynamics models and experimental systems, which is, to the best of our knowledge, the most effective and rigorous strategy for ascertaining the testability of evolutionary game dynamics models.

21 pages, 4 figures, 2 tables (accepted for publication in Physica A:Statistical Mechanics and its Applications 4/24/2017)

References in corpus (5)

• Statistical physics of social dynamics
• Cycle frequency in standard Rock-Paper-Scissors games: Evidence from experimental economics
• The Rock--Paper--Scissors Game
• Periodic frequencies of the cycles in $2\times 2$ games: evidence from experimental economics
• Test MaxEnt in Social Strategy Transitions with Experimental Two-Person Constant Sum 2$\times$2 Games

Cited by in corpus (1)

• Dynamic Structure in Four-strategy Game: Theory and Experiment