Periodic frequencies of the cycles in games: evidence from experimental economics
arXiv:1208.6469 · doi:10.1140/epjb/e2014-31074-2
Abstract
Evolutionary dynamics provides an iconic relationship --- the periodic frequency of a game is determined by the payoff matrix of the game. This paper reports the first experimental evidence to demonstrate this relationship. Evidence comes from two populations randomly-matched games with 12 different payoff matrix parameters. The directions, frequencies and changes in the radius of the cycles are measured definitively. The main finding is that the observed periodic frequencies of the persistent cycles are significantly different in games with different parameters. Two replicator dynamics, standard and adjusted, are employed as predictors for the periodic frequency. Interestingly, both of the models could infer the difference of the observed frequencies well. The experimental frequencies linearly, positively and significantly relate to the theoretical frequencies, but the adjusted model performs slightly better.
11 page, 5 figures, Keywords: frequency, period, evolutionary game theory, experimental economics, definitive measurement, detailed balance condition, repeated game Reported in 2012 Regional ESA Conference, Tucson, US., 2012-11-16. Accpeted for pubilication in European Physical Journal B, 2014-01-02, PACS. 87.23.Cc 02.50.Le 89.65.-s. European Physical Journal B (2014)
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