Deterministic and stochastic cooperation transitions in evolutionary games on networks
arXiv:2210.01710 · doi:10.1103/PhysRevE.107.054302
Abstract
Although the cooperative dynamics emerging from a network of interacting players has been exhaustively investigated, it is not yet fully understood when and how network reciprocity drives cooperation transitions. In this work, we investigate the critical behavior of evolutionary social dilemmas on structured populations by using the framework of master equations and Monte Carlo simulations. The developed theory describes the existence of absorbing, quasi-absorbing, and mixed strategy states and the transition nature, continuous or discontinuous, between the states as the parameters of the system change. In particular, when the decision-making process is deterministic, in the limit of zero effective temperature of the Fermi function, we find that the copying probabilities are discontinuous functions of the system's parameters and of the network degrees sequence. This may induce abrupt changes in the final state for any system size, in excellent agreement with the Monte Carlo simulation results. Our analysis also reveals the existence of continuous and discontinuous phase transitions for large systems as the temperature increases, which is explained in the mean-field approximation. Interestingly, for some game parameters, we find optimal "social temperatures" maximizing/minimizing the cooperation frequency/density.
arXiv comment14 pages, 5 figures
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