Imitation dynamics and the replicator equation

Abstract

Evolutionary game theory has impacted many fields of research by providing a mathematical framework for studying the evolution and maintenance of social and moral behaviors. This success is owed in large part to the demonstration that the central equation of this theory - the replicator equation - is the deterministic limit of a stochastic imitation (social learning) dynamics. Here we offer an alternative elementary proof of this result, which holds for the scenario where players compare their instantaneous (not average) payoffs to decide whether to maintain or change their strategies, and only more successful individuals can be imitated.

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• Finite Population Dynamics Resolve the Central Paradox of the Inspection Game