activity
19962026
most citedProbabilistic Analysis of the Number Partitioning Problem

81 citations · 1.1k across the 90 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators

90 papers

cond-mat.stat-mech2026

Revisiting the non-equilibrium phase transitions of the continuous-trait Axelrod model

Sandro M. Reia, Paulo R. A. Campos, José F. Fontanari

We investigate the non-equilibrium phase transitions of the continuous-trait Axelrod model, an agent-based framework where individual culture is represented by a vector of cont…

physics.soc-ph2026

Exact Scaling Theory of Social Tipping Phenomena in Finite Populations

Bianca Y. S. Ishikawa, José F. Fontanari

Granovetter's threshold model provides a classical framework for social mobilization, where collective action spreads through cascades as individuals join once movement size reache…

physics.soc-ph2026

Exact Solution of Granovetter's Threshold Model for a Finite Population

José F. Fontanari

The Granovetter threshold model formalizes collective behavior by assuming that individual agents face a binary decision to join a movement, doing so only when the number of alread…

q-bio.QM2026

The Same Problem by Different Names: Unifying Regression Dilution and Regression to the Mean

José F. Fontanari, Mauro Santos

Regression to the Mean (RTM) and Regression Dilution are traditionally treated as unrelated issues in the clinical and ecological literatures. In this work, we demonstrate that wit…

physics.soc-ph2026

Competitive Social Mobilization in Threshold Models of Collective Action

Bianca Y. S. Ishikawa, José F. Fontanari

Social mobilization often fails not for a lack of collective interest, but because of fierce competition between rival movements for the same limited pool of participants. We gener…

physics.soc-ph2025

Finite Population Dynamics Resolve the Central Paradox of the Inspection Game

Bianca Y. S. Ishikawa, José F. Fontanari

The Inspection Game is the canonical model for the strategic conflict between law enforcement (inspectors) and citizens (potential criminals). Its classical Mixed-Strategy Nash Equ…