Alliance formation with exclusion in the spatial public goods game

Abstract

Detecting defection and alarming partners about the possible danger could be essential to avoid being exploited. This act, however, may require a huge individual effort from those who take this job, hence such a strategy seems to be unfavorable. But structured populations can provide an opportunity where a largely unselfish excluder strategy can form an effective alliance with other cooperative strategies, hence they can sweep out defection. Interestingly, this alliance is functioning even at the extremely high cost of exclusion where the sole application of an exclusion strategy would be harmful otherwise. These results may explain why the emergence of extreme selfless behavior is not necessarily against individual selection but could be the result of an evolutionary process.

8 pages, 7 figures

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Cited by in corpus (18)

• Evolutionary dynamics in the public goods games with switching between punishment and exclusion
• Early exclusion leads to cyclical cooperation in repeated group interactions
• Strategy dependent learning activity in cyclic dominant systems
• Blocking defector invasion by focusing on the most successful partner
• Involution game with spatio-temporal heterogeneity of social resources
• Competition of alliances in a cyclically dominant eight-species population
• Spatial public goods games with queueing and reputation
• Indirect exclusion can promote cooperation in repeated group interactions
• An evolutionary game with reputation-based imitation-mutation dynamics
• Effects of Dynamic-Win-Stay-Lose-Learn model with voluntary participation in social dilemma
• The evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods game with tolerant punishment based on reputation threshold
• Equal partners do better in defensive alliances
• Effects of a pestilent species on the stability of cyclically dominant species
• Oppressed species can form a winning pair in a multi-species ecosystem
• Competition among alliances of different sizes
• Reputation assimilation mechanism for sustaining cooperation
• Mixed strategy approach destabilizes cooperation in finite populations with clustering coefficient
• Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in a population with probabilistic corrupt enforcers and violators