Alliance formation with exclusion in the spatial public goods game

Abstract

Detecting defection and alarming partners about the possible danger could be essential to avoid being exploited. This act, however, may require a huge individual effort from those who take this job, hence such a strategy seems to be unfavorable. But structured populations can provide an opportunity where a largely unselfish excluder strategy can form an effective alliance with other cooperative strategies, hence they can sweep out defection. Interestingly, this alliance is functioning even at the extremely high cost of exclusion where the sole application of an exclusion strategy would be harmful otherwise. These results may explain why the emergence of extreme selfless behavior is not necessarily against individual selection but could be the result of an evolutionary process.

arXiv comment8 pages, 7 figures

References in corpus (24)

• Evolutionary games on graphs
• Coevolutionary games - a mini review
• Evolutionary dynamics of group interactions on structured populations: A review
• Co-evolution of strategy and structure in complex networks with dynamical linking
• Reward and cooperation in the spatial public goods game
• Topology independent impact of noise on cooperation in spatial public goods games
• Punish, but not too hard: How costly punishment spreads in the spatial public goods game
• Evolutionary establishment of moral and double moral standards through spatial interactions
• Critical Coarsening without Surface Tension: the Voter Universality Class
• Rewarding evolutionary fitness with links between populations promotes cooperation
• Competition of individual and institutional punishments in spatial public goods games
• Evolutionary advantages of adaptive rewarding
• Coarsening and persistence in the voter model
• Rock-scissors-paper game on regular small-world networks
• Competition of tolerant strategies in the spatial public goods game
• The evolution of cooperation by social exclusion
• Selection of noise level in strategy adoption for spatial social dilemmas
• Evolutionary Games defined at the Network Mesoscale: The Public Goods game
• Antisocial pool rewarding does not deter public cooperation
• Spatial snowdrift game with myopic agents
• Conformity-Driven Agents Support Ordered Phases in the Spatial Public Goods Game
• Effects of income redistribution on the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games
• High-performance parallel computing in the classroom using the public goods game as an example
• The Shared Reward Dilemma

Cited by in corpus (21)

• Evolutionary dynamics in the public goods games with switching between punishment and exclusion
• Central governance based on monitoring and reporting solves the collective-risk social dilemma
• Early exclusion leads to cyclical cooperation in repeated group interactions
• Leaving bads provides better outcome than approaching goods in a social dilemma
• Strategy dependent learning activity in cyclic dominant systems
• Blocking defector invasion by focusing on the most successful partner
• Involution game with spatio-temporal heterogeneity of social resources
• Spatial public goods games with queueing and reputation
• Roles of mutation rate and co-existence of multiple strategy updating rules in evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games
• Competition of alliances in a cyclically dominant eight-species population
• Indirect exclusion can promote cooperation in repeated group interactions
• An evolutionary game with reputation-based imitation-mutation dynamics
• Effects of Dynamic-Win-Stay-Lose-Learn model with voluntary participation in social dilemma
• The evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods game with tolerant punishment based on reputation threshold
• Effects of a pestilent species on the stability of cyclically dominant species
• Equal partners do better in defensive alliances
• Oppressed species can form a winning pair in a multi-species ecosystem
• Competition among alliances of different sizes
• Reputation assimilation mechanism for sustaining cooperation
• Mixed strategy approach destabilizes cooperation in finite populations with clustering coefficient
• Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in a population with probabilistic corrupt enforcers and violators