Influence of opinion dynamics on the evolution of games

Abstract

Under certain circumstances such as lack of information or bounded rationality, human players can take decisions on which strategy to choose in a game on the basis of simple opinions. These opinions can be modified after each round by observing own or others payoff results but can be also modified after interchanging impressions with other players. In this way, the update of the strategies can become a question that goes beyond simple evolutionary rules based on fitness and become a social issue. In this work, we explore this scenario by coupling a game with an opinion dynamics model. The opinion is represented by a continuous variable that corresponds to the certainty of the agents respect to which strategy is best. The opinions transform into actions by making the selection of an strategy a stochastic event with a probability regulated by the opinion. A certain regard for the previous round payoff is included but the main update rules of the opinion are given by a model inspired in social interchanges. We find that the dynamics fixed points of the coupled model is different from those of the evolutionary game or the opinion models alone. Furthermore, new features emerge such as the resilience of the fraction of cooperators to the topology of the social interaction network or to the presence of a small fraction of extremist players.

7 pages, 5 figures

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Cited by in corpus (6)

• Opinion dynamics: models, extensions and external effects
• A two-layer model for coevolving opinion dynamics and collective decision-making in complex social systems
• Social imitation vs strategic choice, or consensus vs cooperation in the networked Prisoner's Dilemma
• Quantum games of opinion formation based on the Marinatto-Weber quantum game scheme
• $N$-player game formulation of the majority-vote model of opinion dynamics
• Hierarchical invasion of cooperation in complex networks