Prisoner's dilemma in structured scale-free networks
arXiv:0905.2724 · doi:10.1088/1751-8113/42/24/245002
Abstract
The conventional wisdom is that scale-free networks are prone to cooperation spreading. In this paper we investigate the cooperative behaviors on the structured scale-free network. On the contrary of the conventional wisdom that scale-free networks are prone to cooperation spreading, the evolution of cooperation is inhibited on the structured scale-free network while performing the prisoner's dilemma (PD) game. Firstly, we demonstrate that neither the scale-free property nor the high clustering coefficient is responsible for the inhibition of cooperation spreading on the structured scale-free network. Then we provide one heuristic method to argue that the lack of age correlations and its associated `large-world' behavior in the structured scale-free network inhibit the spread of cooperation. The findings may help enlighten further studies on evolutionary dynamics of the PD game in scale-free networks.
Definitive version accepted for publication in Journal of Physics A
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