The prisoners dilemma on a stochastic non-growth network evolution model
arXiv:0711.4887 · doi:10.1103/PhysRevE.78.011904
Abstract
We investigate the evolution of cooperation on a non - growth network model with death/birth dynamics. Nodes reproduce under selection for higher payoffs in a prisoners dilemma game played between network neighbours. The mean field characteristics of the model are explored and an attempt is made to understand the size dependent behaviour of the model in terms of fluctuations in the strategy densities. We also briefly comment on the role of strategy mutation in regulating the strategy densties.
8 pages, 8 figures
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