Evolutionary Games on Networks: Phase Transition, Quasi-equilibrium, and Mathematical Principles
arXiv:2304.14913 · doi:10.1016/j.physa.2023.128447
Abstract
The stable cooperation ratio of spatial evolutionary games has been widely studied using simulations or approximate analysis methods. However, sometimes such ``stable'' cooperation ratios obtained via approximate methods might not be actually stable, but correspond to quasi-equilibriums instead. We find that various classic game models, like the evolutionary snowdrift game, evolutionary prisoner's dilemma, and spatial public goods game on square lattices and scale-free networks, exhibit the phase transition in convergence time to the equilibrium state. Moreover, mathematical principles are provided to explain the phase transition of convergence time and quasi-equilibrium of cooperation ratio. The findings explain why and when cooperation and defection have a long-term coexistence.
arXiv comment11 pages, 7 figures
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