Diversity and critical behavior in prisoner's dilemma game
arXiv:1006.3607 · doi:10.1103/PhysRevE.83.057102
Abstract
The prisoner's dilemma (PD) game is a simple model for understanding cooperative patterns in complex systems consisting of selfish individuals. Here, we study a PD game problem in scale-free networks containing hierarchically organized modules and controllable shortcuts connecting separated hubs. We find that cooperator clusters exhibit a percolation transition in the parameter space (p,b), where p is the occupation probability of shortcuts and b is the temptation payoff in the PD game. The cluster size distribution follows a power law at the transition point. Such a critical behavior, resulting from the combined effect of stochastic processes in the PD game and the heterogeneous structure of complex networks, illustrates the diversity of social relationships and the self-organization of cooperator communities in real-world systems.
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