paper

Time-dependent effects hinder cooperation on the public goods game

arXiv:2205.09434 · doi:10.1016/j.chaos.2022.112206

Abstract

The public goods game is a model of a society investing some assets and regaining a profit, although can also model biological populations. In the classic public goods game only two strategies compete: either cooperate or defect; a third strategy is often implemented to asses punishment, which is a mechanism to promote cooperation. The conditions of the game can be of a dynamical nature, therefore we study time-dependent effects such an as oscillation in the enhancement factor, which accounts for productivity changes over time. Furthermore, we continue to study time dependencies on the game with a delay on the punishment time. We conclude that both the oscillations on the productivity and the punishment delay concur in the detriment of cooperation.

arXiv commentAccepted in the journal Chaos Solitons and Fractals, May 2022

References in corpus (8)