Evolution of cooperation driven by active information spreading
arXiv:1907.02058 · doi:10.1103/PhysRevE.100.042303
Abstract
Cooperators forgo their interest to benefit others. Thus cooperation should not be favored by natural selection. It challenges the evolutionists, since cooperation is widespread. As one of the resolutions, information spreading has been revealed to play a key role in the emergence of cooperation. Individuals, however, are typically assumed to be passive in the information spreading. Here we assume that individuals are active to spread the information via self-recommendation. Individuals with higher intensities of self-recommendation are likely to have more neighbors. We find that i) eloquent cooperators are necessary to promote cooperation; ii) individuals need to be open to the self-recommendation to enhance cooperation level; iii) the cost-to-benefit ratio should be smaller than one minus the ratio between self-recommendation intensities of defector and cooperator, which qualitatively measures the viscosity of the population. Our results highlight the importance of active information spreading on cooperation.
arXiv comment14 pages, 4 figures
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