Tailored bright illumination attack on distributed-phase-reference protocols
arXiv:1012.4366 · doi:10.1080/09500340.2011.565889
Abstract
Detector control attacks on quantum key distribution systems exploit the linear mode of avalanche photodiode in single photon detectors. So far, the protocols under consideration have been the BB84 protocol and its derivatives. Here we present how bright tailored illumination exploiting the linear mode of detectors can be used to eavesdrop on distributed-phase-reference protocols, such as differential-phase-shift and coherent-one-way.
5 pages, 3 figures
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