Optimised quantum hacking of superconducting nanowire single-photon detectors
arXiv:1305.5989 · doi:10.1364/OE.22.006734
Abstract
We explore bright-light control of superconducting nanowire single-photon detectors (SNSPDs) in the shunted configuration (a practical measure to avoid latching). In an experiment, we simulate an illumination pattern the SNSPD would receive in a typical quantum key distribution system under hacking attack. We show that it effectively blinds and controls the SNSPD. The transient blinding illumination lasts for a fraction of a microsecond and produces several deterministic fake clicks during this time. This attack does not lead to elevated timing jitter in the spoofed output pulse, and hence does not introduce significant errors. Five different SNSPD chip designs were tested. We consider possible countermeasures to this attack.
Various minor corrections, including: consideration of reset mechanism from normal detection and blinded states; alternate active reset circuits; alternate readout circuits, added detail to application to QKD protocols. 15 pages, 5 figures, 1 table
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