Reply to "Comment on `Resilience of gated avalanche photodiodes against bright illumination attacks in quantum cryptography'"
arXiv:1109.3149 · doi:10.1063/1.3658807
Abstract
This is a Reply to the Comment by Lydersen et al. [arXiv: 1106.3756v1].
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- Hacking commercial quantum cryptography systems by tailored bright illumination
- Quantum key distribution over 122 km of standard telecom fiber
- High speed single photon detection in the near-infrared
- An avalanche-photodiode-based photon-number-resolving detector
- After-gate attack on a quantum cryptosystem
- Avoiding the Detector Blinding Attack on Quantum Cryptography
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- Resilience of gated avalanche photodiodes against bright illumination attacks in quantum cryptography
- Superlinear threshold detectors in quantum cryptography
- Multi-gigahertz operation of photon counting InGaAs avalanche photodiodes
- Comment on "Resilience of gated avalanche photodiodes against bright illumination attacks in quantum cryptography"
- Evolution of locally excited avalanches in semiconductors
Cited by in corpus (9)
- Secure Quantum Key Distribution
- Long distance measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution with entangled photon sources
- Real-time monitoring of single-photon detectors against eavesdropping in quantum key distribution systems
- Optimised quantum hacking of superconducting nanowire single-photon detectors
- Controlling single-photon detector ID210 with bright light
- Robust countermeasure against detector control attack in practical quantum key distribution system
- Preparing a commercial quantum key distribution system for certification against implementation loopholes
- Safeguarding Quantum Key Distribution through Detection Randomization
- Loss-tolerant quantum key distribution with detection efficiency mismatch