Resilience of gated avalanche photodiodes against bright illumination attacks in quantum cryptography
arXiv:1106.2675 · doi:10.1063/1.3597221
Abstract
Semiconductor avalanche photodiodes (APDs) are commonly used for single photon detection in quantum key distribution. Recently, many attacks using bright illumination have been proposed to manipulate gated InGaAs APDs. In order to devise effective counter-measures, careful analysis of these attacks must be carried out to distinguish between incorrect operation and genuine loopholes. Here, we show that correctly-operated, gated APDs are immune to continuous-wave illumination attacks, while monitoring the photocurrent for anomalously high values is a straightforward counter-measure against attacks using temporally tailored light.
References in corpus (10)
- Hacking commercial quantum cryptography systems by tailored bright illumination
- Quantum key distribution over 122 km of standard telecom fiber
- Gigahertz decoy quantum key distribution with 1 Mbit/s secure key rate
- High speed single photon detection in the near-infrared
- Controlling passively-quenched single photon detectors by bright light
- After-gate attack on a quantum cryptosystem
- Continuous operation of high bit rate quantum key distribution
- Avoiding the Detector Blinding Attack on Quantum Cryptography
- Thermal blinding of gated detectors in quantum cryptography
- Evolution of locally excited avalanches in semiconductors
Cited by in corpus (23)
- Secure Quantum Key Distribution
- Long term performance of the SwissQuantum quantum key distribution network in a field environment
- Field and long-term demonstration of a wide area quantum key distribution network
- Protocol choice and parameter optimization in decoy-state measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution
- Measurement-device-independent quantum cryptography
- Real-time monitoring of single-photon detectors against eavesdropping in quantum key distribution systems
- Random Variation of Detector Efficiency: A Countermeasure against Detector Blinding Attacks for Quantum Key Distribution
- Securing practical quantum communication systems with optical power limiters
- Hacking the quantum key distribution system by exploiting the avalanche transition region of single photon detectors
- Robust countermeasure against detector control attack in practical quantum key distribution system
- Preparing a commercial quantum key distribution system for certification against implementation loopholes
- Comments on the "Generalized" KLJN Key Exchanger with Arbitrary Resistors: Power, Impedance, Security
- Strong pulse illumination hacks self-differencing avalanche photodiode detectors in a high-speed quantum key distribution system
- Quantified Effects of the Laser Seeding Attack in Quantum Key Distribution
- Safeguarding Quantum Key Distribution through Detection Randomization
- Randomized ancillary qubit overcomes detector-control and intercept-resend hacking of quantum key distribution
- Perspective -- On the thermodynamics of perfect unconditional security
- Automated verification of countermeasure against detector-control attack in quantum key distribution
- Quantum hacking perceiving for quantum key distribution using temporal ghost imaging
- Backflashes in fast-gated avalanche photodiodes in quantum key distribution
- Countermeasure against quantum hacking using detection statistics
- Loss-tolerant quantum key distribution with detection efficiency mismatch
- Countering detector manipulation attacks in quantum communication through detector self-testing