Intrinsic mitigation of the after-gate attack in quantum key distribution through fast-gated delayed detection
arXiv:1908.10643 · doi:10.1103/PhysRevApplied.12.024050
Abstract
The information theoretic security promised by quantum key distribution (QKD) holds as long as the assumptions in the theoretical model match the parameters in the physical implementation. The superlinear behaviour of sensitive single-photon detectors represents one such mismatch and can pave the way to powerful attacks hindering the security of QKD systems, a prominent example being the after-gate attack. A longstanding tenet is that trapped carriers causing delayed detection can help mitigate this attack, but despite intensive scrutiny, it remains largely unproven. Here we approach this problem from a physical perspective and find new evidence to support a detector's secure response. We experimentally investigate two different carrier trapping mechanisms causing delayed detection in fast-gated semiconductor avalanche photodiodes, one arising from the multiplication layer, the other from the heterojunction interface between absorption and charge layers. The release of trapped carriers increases the quantum bit error rate measured under the after-gate attack above the typical QKD security threshold, thus favouring the detector's inherent security. This represents a significant step to avert quantum hacking of QKD systems.
arXiv comment8 pages, 6 figures
References in corpus (35)
- Quantum Cryptography
- Quantum cryptography: Public key distribution and coin tossing
- Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution
- Overcoming the rate-distance barrier of quantum key distribution without using quantum repeaters
- Field test of quantum key distribution in the Tokyo QKD Network
- Hacking commercial quantum cryptography systems by tailored bright illumination
- Side-channel-free quantum key distribution
- Trojan Horse attacks on Quantum Key Distribution systems
- Full-field implementation of a perfect eavesdropper on a quantum cryptography system
- Gigahertz decoy quantum key distribution with 1 Mbit/s secure key rate
- High speed single photon detection in the near-infrared
- Integrating quantum key distribution with classical communications in backbone fiber network
- 10~Mb/s quantum key distribution
- After-gate attack on a quantum cryptosystem
- Design and Performance of an InGaAs-InP Single-Photon Avalanche Diode Detector
- Avoiding the Detector Blinding Attack on Quantum Cryptography
- Metropolitan quantum key distribution with silicon photonics
- Practical security bounds against the Trojan-horse attack in quantum key distribution
- Simple 2.5 GHz time-bin quantum key distribution
- GHz-gated InGaAs/InP single-photon detector with detection efficiency exceeding 55% at 1550 nm
- Resilience of gated avalanche photodiodes against bright illumination attacks in quantum cryptography
- Superlinear threshold detectors in quantum cryptography
- Room temperature single-photon detectors for high bit rate quantum key distribution
- Creation of backdoors in quantum communications via laser damage
- Reply to "Avoiding the Detector Blinding Attack on Quantum Cryptography"
- Controlling an actively-quenched single photon detector with bright light
- Eavesdropping and countermeasures for backflash side channel in quantum cryptography
- Random Variation of Detector Efficiency: A Countermeasure against Detector Blinding Attacks for Quantum Key Distribution
- Hacking the quantum key distribution system by exploiting the avalanche transition region of single photon detectors
- Secure gated detection scheme for quantum cryptography
- Integration of quantum key distribution and gigabit-capable passive optical network based on wavelength-division multiplexing
- Efficient quantum key distribution with practical sources and detectors
- Best-practice criteria for practical security of self-differencing avalanche photodiode detectors in quantum key distribution
- Safeguarding Quantum Key Distribution through Detection Randomization
- Intensity modulation as a preemptive measure against blinding of single-photon detectors based on self-differencing cancellation
Cited by in corpus (4)
- Preparing a commercial quantum key distribution system for certification against implementation loopholes
- Automated verification of countermeasure against detector-control attack in quantum key distribution
- Quantum hacking perceiving for quantum key distribution using temporal ghost imaging
- Energy-time attack on detectors in quantum key distribution