Random Variation of Detector Efficiency: A Countermeasure against Detector Blinding Attacks for Quantum Key Distribution

Abstract

In the recent decade, it has been discovered that QKD systems are extremely vulnerable to side-channel attacks. In particular, by exploiting the internal working knowledge of practical detectors, it is possible to bring them to an operating region whereby only certain target detectors are sensitive to detections. Crucially, the adversary can use this loophole to learn everything about the secret key without introducing any error to the quantum channel. In this work, as a step towards overcoming detector blinding attacks, we focus on an experimentally convenient countermeasure, where the efficiency of the detectors is randomly varied.

arXiv commentInvited paper: 5 pages, 2 figures

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• Measurement-device-independent quantum communication with an untrusted source
• Deployed MDI-QKD and Bell-State Measurements Coexisting with Standard Internet Data and Networking Equipment
• Robust countermeasure against detector control attack in practical quantum key distribution system
• Preparing a commercial quantum key distribution system for certification against implementation loopholes
• Source-independent quantum random number generator against tailored detector blinding attacks
• Cable Capacitance Attack against the KLJN Secure Key Exchange
• Strong pulse illumination hacks self-differencing avalanche photodiode detectors in a high-speed quantum key distribution system
• Secure detection in quantum key distribution by real-time calibration of receiver
• Detector-device-independent QKD: security analysis and fast implementation
• Countermeasure against blinding attacks on low-noise detectors with background noise cancellation scheme
• Randomized ancillary qubit overcomes detector-control and intercept-resend hacking of quantum key distribution
• Characterizing multi-photon quantum interference with practical light sources and threshold single-photon detectors
• Efficient High-dimensional Quantum Key Distribution with Hybrid Encoding
• Automated verification of countermeasure against detector-control attack in quantum key distribution
• Detector blinding attacks on counterfactual quantum key distribution
• Intensity modulation as a preemptive measure against blinding of single-photon detectors based on self-differencing cancellation
• Quantum hacking perceiving for quantum key distribution using temporal ghost imaging
• Countermeasure against quantum hacking using detection statistics
• Quantum control attack on quantum key distribution systems
• Intrinsic mitigation of the after-gate attack in quantum key distribution through fast-gated delayed detection
• Countering detector manipulation attacks in quantum communication through detector self-testing
• A cost-effective measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution system for quantum networks