Testing random-detector-efficiency countermeasure in a commercial system reveals a breakable unrealistic assumption
arXiv:1601.00993 · doi:10.1109/JQE.2016.2611443
Abstract
In the last decade, efforts have been made to reconcile theoretical security with realistic imperfect implementations of quantum key distribution (QKD). Implementable countermeasures are proposed to patch the discovered loopholes. However, certain countermeasures are not as robust as would be expected. In this paper, we present a concrete example of ID Quantique's random-detector-efficiency countermeasure against detector blinding attacks. As a third-party tester, we have found that the first industrial implementation of this countermeasure is effective against the original blinding attack, but not immune to a modified blinding attack. Then, we implement and test a later full version of this countermeasure containing a security proof [C. C. W. Lim et al., IEEE Journal of Selected Topics in Quantum Electronics, 21, 6601305 (2015)]. We find that it is still vulnerable against the modified blinding attack, because an assumption about hardware characteristics on which the proof relies fails in practice.
arXiv comment12 pages, 12 figures
References in corpus (25)
- Quantum Cryptography
- The Security of Practical Quantum Key Distribution
- Simple Proof of Security of the BB84 Quantum Key Distribution Protocol
- Unconditional Security Of Quantum Key Distribution Over Arbitrarily Long Distances
- Hacking commercial quantum cryptography systems by tailored bright illumination
- Security against individual attacks for realistic quantum key distribution
- Quantum Hacking: Experimental demonstration of time-shift attack against practical quantum key distribution systems
- Trojan Horse attacks on Quantum Key Distribution systems
- Quantum Key Distribution over 67 km with a plug & play system
- An information-theoretic security proof for QKD protocols
- Effects of detector efficiency mismatch on security of quantum cryptosystems
- ``Plug and play'' systems for quantum cryptography
- Preventing Calibration Attacks on the Local Oscillator in Continuous-Variable Quantum Key Distribution
- High rate, long-distance quantum key distribution over 250km of ultra low loss fibres
- Device calibration impacts security of quantum key distribution
- After-gate attack on a quantum cryptosystem
- Thermal blinding of gated detectors in quantum cryptography
- Controlling a superconducting nanowire single-photon detector using tailored bright illumination
- Security loophole in free-space quantum key distribution due to spatial-mode detector-efficiency mismatch
- Superlinear threshold detectors in quantum cryptography
- Creation of backdoors in quantum communications via laser damage
- Passive faraday mirror attack in practical two-way quantum key distribution system
- Controlling an actively-quenched single photon detector with bright light
- Random Variation of Detector Efficiency: A Countermeasure against Detector Blinding Attacks for Quantum Key Distribution
- Detector decoy quantum key distribution
Cited by in corpus (36)
- Secure quantum key distribution with realistic devices
- Homodyne-detector-blinding attack in continuous-variable quantum key distribution
- Laser seeding attack in quantum key distribution
- Decoy state quantum key distribution with imperfect source
- Laser damage attack against optical attenuators in quantum key distribution
- Insecurity of detector-device-independent quantum key distribution
- Backflash light characterization to prevent QKD zero-error hacking
- Eavesdropping and countermeasures for backflash side channel in quantum cryptography
- Protecting fiber-optic quantum key distribution sources against light-injection attacks
- Controlling single-photon detector ID210 with bright light
- Robust countermeasure against detector control attack in practical quantum key distribution system
- An approach for security evaluation and certification of a complete quantum communication system
- Hacking single-photon avalanche detector in quantum key distribution via pulse illumination
- Preparing a commercial quantum key distribution system for certification against implementation loopholes
- Comments on the "Generalized" KLJN Key Exchanger with Arbitrary Resistors: Power, Impedance, Security
- Characterisation of state-preparation uncertainty in quantum key distribution
- Strong pulse illumination hacks self-differencing avalanche photodiode detectors in a high-speed quantum key distribution system
- Detection of ultra-weak laser pulses by free-running single-photon detectors: modeling dead time and dark counts effects
- On the Transmission Probabilities in Quantum Key Distribution Systems over FSO Links
- Secure detection in quantum key distribution by real-time calibration of receiver
- Deterministic Random Number Generator Attack against the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise Secure Key Exchange Protocol
- AC Loop Current Attacks Against The KLJN Secure Key Exchange Scheme
- Randomized ancillary qubit overcomes detector-control and intercept-resend hacking of quantum key distribution
- Security boundaries of an optical power limiter for protecting quantum key distribution systems
- Perspective -- On the thermodynamics of perfect unconditional security
- Features of the Photon Pulse Detection Algorithm in the Quantum Key Distribution System
- Efficient High-dimensional Quantum Key Distribution with Hybrid Encoding
- Faking photon number on a transition-edge sensor
- Comment on "Inherent security of phase coding quantum key distribution systems against detector blinding attacks" [Laser Phys. Lett. 15, 095203 (2018)]
- Automated verification of countermeasure against detector-control attack in quantum key distribution
- Detector blinding attacks on counterfactual quantum key distribution
- Intensity modulation as a preemptive measure against blinding of single-photon detectors based on self-differencing cancellation
- Quantum hacking perceiving for quantum key distribution using temporal ghost imaging
- Countermeasure against quantum hacking using detection statistics
- Bright-light detector control emulates the local bounds of Bell-type inequalities
- Countering detector manipulation attacks in quantum communication through detector self-testing