Deterministic Random Number Generator Attack against the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise Secure Key Exchange Protocol
arXiv:2012.02848 · doi:10.1142/S0219477521500462
Abstract
This paper demonstrates the vulnerability of the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) secure key exchanger to compromised random number generator(s) even if these random numbers are used solely to generate the noises emulating the Johnson noise of Alice's and Bob's resistors. The attacks shown are deterministic in the sense that Eve's knowledge of Alice's and/or Bob's random numbers is basically deterministic. Moreover, no statistical evaluation is needed, except for rarely occurring events of negligible, random waiting time and verification time. We explore two situations. In the first case, Eve knows both Alice's and Bob's random noises. We show that, in this situation, Eve can quickly crack the secure key bit by using Ohm's Law. In the other situation, Eve knows only Bob's random noise. Then Eve first can learn Bob's resistance value by using Ohm's Law. Therefore, she will have the same knowledge as Bob, thus at the end of the bit exchange period, she will know Alice's bit.
arXiv commentarXiv admin note: substantial text overlap with arXiv:2005.10429
References in corpus (59)
- Hacking commercial quantum cryptography systems by tailored bright illumination
- Device calibration impacts security of quantum key distribution
- Experimentally faking the violation of Bell's inequalities
- Trojan-horse attacks threaten the security of practical quantum cryptography
- Totally Secure Classical Communication Utilizing Johnson (-like) Noise and Kirchoff's Law
- After-gate attack on a quantum cryptosystem
- Risk analysis of Trojan-horse attacks on practical quantum key distribution systems
- Laser damage helps the eavesdropper in quantum cryptography
- Thermal blinding of gated detectors in quantum cryptography
- Controlling a superconducting nanowire single-photon detector using tailored bright illumination
- Homodyne-detector-blinding attack in continuous-variable quantum key distribution
- Johnson(-like)-Noise-Kirchhoff-Loop Based Secure Classical Communicator Characteristics, for Ranges of Two to Two Thousand Kilometers, via Model-Line
- Laser seeding attack in quantum key distribution
- Security loophole in free-space quantum key distribution due to spatial-mode detector-efficiency mismatch
- Decoy state quantum key distribution with imperfect source
- Creation of backdoors in quantum communications via laser damage
- Laser damage attack against optical attenuators in quantum key distribution
- Attacks exploiting deviation of mean photon number in quantum key distribution and coin tossing
- Testing random-detector-efficiency countermeasure in a commercial system reveals a breakable unrealistic assumption
- Noise in the wire: the real impact of wire resistance for the Johnson (-like) noise based secure communicator
- Notes on Recent Approaches Concerning the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise-based Secure Key Exchange
- Invisible Trojan-horse attack
- Insecurity of detector-device-independent quantum key distribution
- On the security of the Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) communicator
- Implementation vulnerabilities in general quantum cryptography
- Protection against the man-in-the-middle-attack for the Kirchhoff-loop-Johnson(-like)-noise cipher and expansion by voltage-based security
- Critical analysis of the Bennett-Riedel attack on secure cryptographic key distributions via the Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise scheme
- Eavesdropping and countermeasures for backflash side channel in quantum cryptography
- Tailored bright illumination attack on distributed-phase-reference protocols
- Generalized Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) secure key exchange system using arbitrary resistors
- Totally secure classical networks with multipoint telecloning (teleportation) of classical bits through loops with Johnson-like noise
- Noise properties in the ideal Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise secure communication system
- Do electromagnetic waves exist in a short cable at low frequencies? What does physics say?
- Errors and their mitigation at the Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise secure key exchange
- Information theoretically secure, enhanced Johnson noise based key distribution over the smart grid with switched filters
- Enhanced secure key exchange systems based on the Johnson-noise scheme
- Current and voltage based bit errors and their combined mitigation for the Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise secure key exchange
- Optimised quantum hacking of superconducting nanowire single-photon detectors
- On the "cracking" scheme in the paper "A directional coupler attack against the Kish key distribution system" by Gunn, Allison and Abbott
- Physical uncloneable function hardware keys utilizing Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise secure key exchange and noise-based logic
- Eavesdropper's ability to attack a free-space quantum-key-distribution receiver in atmospheric turbulence
- Unconditionally secure computers, algorithms and hardware, such as memories, processors, keyboards, flash and hard drives
- Controlling single-photon detector ID210 with bright light
- Securing vehicle communication systems by the KLJN key exchange protocol
- Effective Privacy Amplification for Secure Classical Communications
- Elimination of a Second-Law-attack, and all cable-resistance-based attacks, in the Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) secure key exchange system
- Random-resistor-random-temperature Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (RRRT-KLJN) key exchange
- On KLJN-based secure key distribution in vehicular communication networks
- What kind of noise guarantees security for the Kirchhoff-Loop-Johnson-Noise key exchange?
- A universal setup for active control of a single-photon detector
- Finite-key-size effect in commercial plug-and-play QKD system
- Analysis of an attenuator artifact in an experimental attack by Gunn-Allison-Abbott against the Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) secure key exchange system
- Resource requirements and speed versus geometry of unconditionally secure physical key exchanges
- Optical control of single-photon negative-feedback avalanche diode detector
- Comments on the "Generalized" KLJN Key Exchanger with Arbitrary Resistors: Power, Impedance, Security
- Comments On "A New Transient Attack On The Kish Key Distribution System"
- Cable Capacitance Attack against the KLJN Secure Key Exchange
- Enhanced usage of keys obtained by physical, unconditionally secure distributions
- Generalized DC loop current attack against the KLJN secure key exchange scheme