Do electromagnetic waves exist in a short cable at low frequencies? What does physics say?

Abstract

We refute a physical model, recently proposed by Gunn, Allison and Abbott (GAA) [arXiv:1402.2709v2], to utilize electromagnetic waves for eavesdropping on the Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) secure key distribution. Their model, and its theoretical underpinnings, is found to be fundamentally flawed because their assumption of electromagnetic waves violates not only the wave equation but also the Second Law of Thermodynamics, the Principle of Detailed Balance, Boltzmann's Energy Equipartition Theorem, and Planck's formula by implying infinitely strong blackbody radiation. We deduce the correct mathematical model of the GAA scheme, which is based on impedances at the quasi-static limit. Mathematical analysis and simulation results confirm our approach and prove that GAA's experimental interpretation is incorrect too.

version after Galley Proof corrections in Fluctuation and Noise Letters

Cited by in corpus (6)

• On the "cracking" scheme in the paper "A directional coupler attack against the Kish key distribution system" by Gunn, Allison and Abbott
• Elimination of a Second-Law-attack, and all cable-resistance-based attacks, in the Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) secure key exchange system
• Analysis of an attenuator artifact in an experimental attack by Gunn-Allison-Abbott against the Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) secure key exchange system
• Resource requirements and speed versus geometry of unconditionally secure physical key exchanges
• Waves in a short cable at low frequencies, or just hand-waving?
• Facts, myths and fights about the KLJN classical physical key exchanger