Random Number Generator Attack against the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise Secure Key Exchange Protocol
arXiv:2005.10429
Abstract
This paper introduces and demonstrates two new attacks against the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) secure key exchange scheme. The attacks are based on random number generators with compromised security. First we explore the situation in which Eve knows the seed of both Alice's and Bob's random number generators. We show that in this situation Eve can crack the secure key bit within a fraction of the bit exchange period even if her current and voltage measurements have only a single bit of resolution. In the second attack, we explore the situation in which Eve knows the seed of only Alice's random number generator. We show that in this situation Eve can still crack the secure key bit but she needs to use the whole bit exchange period for the attack. The security of the KLJN key exchange scheme, similarly to other protocols, necessitates that the random number generator outputs are truly random for Eve.
arXiv comment14 pages, 11 figures
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