Attacks exploiting deviation of mean photon number in quantum key distribution and coin tossing

Abstract

The security of quantum communication using a weak coherent source requires an accurate knowledge of the source's mean photon number. Finite calibration precision or an active manipulation by an attacker may cause the actual emitted photon number to deviate from the known value. We model effects of this deviation on the security of three quantum communication protocols: the Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol without decoy states, Scarani-Acin-Ribordy-Gisin 2004 (SARG04) QKD protocol, and a coin-tossing protocol. For QKD, we model both a strong attack using technology possible in principle, and a realistic attack bounded by today's technology. To maintain the mean photon number in two-way systems, such as plug-and-play and relativistic quantum cryptography schemes, bright pulse energy incoming from the communication channel must be monitored. Implementation of a monitoring detector has largely been ignored so far, except for ID Quantique's commercial QKD system Clavis2. We scrutinize this implementation for security problems, and show that designing a hack-proof pulse-energy-measuring detector is far from trivial. Indeed the first implementation has three serious flaws confirmed experimentally, each of which may be exploited in a cleverly constructed Trojan-horse attack. We discuss requirements for a loophole-free implementation of the monitoring detector.

15 pages, 13 figures, Improved Introduction and Conclusion, Published in Physical Review A, Accepted at QCrypt 2014, 4th international conference on quantum cryptography, September 1-5, 2014 in Paris, France http://2014.qcrypt.net/program/

References in corpus (33)

• Simple Proof of Security of the BB84 Quantum Key Distribution Protocol
• Unconditional Security Of Quantum Key Distribution Over Arbitrarily Long Distances
• Quantum Key Distribution with High Loss: Toward Global Secure Communication
• Detecting Single Infrared Photons with 93% System Efficiency
• Hacking commercial quantum cryptography systems by tailored bright illumination
• Practical Decoy State for Quantum Key Distribution
• Quantum cryptography protocols robust against photon number splitting attacks for weak laser pulses implementations
• Security against individual attacks for realistic quantum key distribution
• Quantum Hacking: Experimental demonstration of time-shift attack against practical quantum key distribution systems
• Trojan Horse attacks on Quantum Key Distribution systems
• Quantum Key Distribution over 67 km with a plug & play system
• An information-theoretic security proof for QKD protocols
• Effects of detector efficiency mismatch on security of quantum cryptosystems
• ``Plug and play'' systems for quantum cryptography
• High rate, long-distance quantum key distribution over 250km of ultra low loss fibres
• Device calibration impacts security of quantum key distribution
• Estimates for practical quantum cryptography
• Unambiguous state discrimination in quantum cryptography with weak coherent states
• After-gate attack on a quantum cryptosystem
• Laser damage helps the eavesdropper in quantum cryptography
• Passive faraday mirror attack in practical two-way quantum key distribution system
• Experimental plug&play quantum coin flipping
• Flipping quantum coins
• Squashing model for detectors and applications to quantum key distribution protocols
• Photon-Number-Splitting versus Cloning Attacks in Practical Implementations of the Bennett-Brassard 1984 protocol for Quantum Cryptography
• Faint laser quantum key distribution: Eavesdropping exploiting multiphoton pulses
• Fair Loss-Tolerant Quantum Coin Flipping
• Detector decoy quantum key distribution
• Practical quantum key distribution: On the security evaluation with inefficient single-photon detectors
• Relativistic Quantum Cryptography
• Practical Quantum Coin Flipping
• Security proof of the unbalanced phase-encoded BB84 protocol
• Plug-and-Play Measurement-Device-Independent Quantum Key Distribution

Cited by in corpus (44)

• Secure quantum key distribution with realistic devices
• Practical security bounds against the Trojan-horse attack in quantum key distribution
• Homodyne-detector-blinding attack in continuous-variable quantum key distribution
• Laser seeding attack in quantum key distribution
• Security loophole in free-space quantum key distribution due to spatial-mode detector-efficiency mismatch
• Decoy state quantum key distribution with imperfect source
• Experimental quantum key distribution with source flaws
• Creation of backdoors in quantum communications via laser damage
• Laser damage attack against optical attenuators in quantum key distribution
• Effect of source tampering in the security of quantum cryptography
• Invisible Trojan-horse attack
• Insecurity of detector-device-independent quantum key distribution
• Implementation vulnerabilities in general quantum cryptography
• Eavesdropping and countermeasures for backflash side channel in quantum cryptography
• Protecting fiber-optic quantum key distribution sources against light-injection attacks
• High dimensional measurement device independent quantum key distribution on two dimensional subspaces
• Measurement-device-independent quantum communication with an untrusted source
• Hacking Quantum Key Distribution via Injection Locking
• Securing practical quantum communication systems with optical power limiters
• Eavesdropper's ability to attack a free-space quantum-key-distribution receiver in atmospheric turbulence
• Controlling single-photon detector ID210 with bright light
• Quantum key distribution with setting-choice-independently correlated light sources
• An approach for security evaluation and certification of a complete quantum communication system
• Burning the Trojan Horse: Defending against Side-Channel Attacks in QKD
• Comments on the "Generalized" KLJN Key Exchanger with Arbitrary Resistors: Power, Impedance, Security
• Attacking quantum key distribution by light injection via ventilation openings
• Multiphoton and side-channel attacks in mistrustful quantum cryptography
• Modular quantum key distribution setup for research and development applications
• Classical multiparty computation using quantum resources
• Deterministic Random Number Generator Attack against the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise Secure Key Exchange Protocol
• AC Loop Current Attacks Against The KLJN Secure Key Exchange Scheme
• Measurement-Device-Independent Quantum Coin Tossing
• Quantum key distribution with simply characterized light sources
• Intensity modulation as a preemptive measure against blinding of single-photon detectors based on self-differencing cancellation
• Detector blinding attacks on counterfactual quantum key distribution
• Quantum key distribution component loopholes in 1500-2100 nm range perspective for Trojan-horse attacks
• Wide-spectrum security of quantum key distribution
• Realistic vulnerabilities of decoy-state quantum key distribution
• Random Number Generator Attack against the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise Secure Key Exchange Protocol
• Reference-Beam Attacks against Twin-Field Quantum Key Distribution using Optical Injection Locking
• Quantum oblivious transfer: a short review
• Countermeasures for Trojan-Horse Attacks on self-compensating all-fiber polarization modulator
• Energy-time attack on detectors in quantum key distribution
• Nonlinearity Attack against the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) Secure Key Exchange Protocol