Countermeasures for Trojan-Horse Attacks on self-compensating all-fiber polarization modulator

Abstract

Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) leverages the principles of quantum mechanics to exchange a secret key between two parties. Unlike classical cryptographic systems, the security of QKD is not reliant on computational assumptions but is instead rooted in the fundamental laws of physics. In a QKD protocol, any attempt by an eavesdropper to intercept the key is detectable: this provides an unprecedented level of security, making QKD an attractive solution for secure communication in an era increasingly threatened by the advent of quantum computers and their potential to break classical cryptographic systems. However, QKD also faces several practical challenges such as transmission loss and noise in quantum channels, finite key size effects, and implementation flaws in QKD devices. Addressing these issues is crucial for the large-scale deployment of QKD and the realization of a global quantum internet. A whole body of research is dedicated to the hacking of the quantum states source, for example using Trojan-Horse attacks (THAs), where the eavesdropper injects light into the system and analyzes the back-reflected signal. In this paper, we study the vulnerabilities against THAs of the iPOGNAC encoder, first introduced in Avesani, Agnesi et al., to propose adapted countermeasures that can mitigate such attacks.

References in corpus (23)

• Quantum Cryptography
• Quantum cryptography: Public key distribution and coin tossing
• Gaussian Quantum Information
• Overcoming the rate-distance barrier of quantum key distribution without using quantum repeaters
• Trojan Horse attacks on Quantum Key Distribution systems
• Trojan-horse attacks threaten the security of practical quantum cryptography
• Risk analysis of Trojan-horse attacks on practical quantum key distribution systems
• Practical security bounds against the Trojan-horse attack in quantum key distribution
• Fast and simple qubit-based synchronization for quantum key distribution
• Attacks exploiting deviation of mean photon number in quantum key distribution and coin tossing
• Simple and high-speed polarization-based QKD
• Semidefinite programming relaxations for quantum correlations
• Protecting fiber-optic quantum key distribution sources against light-injection attacks
• Stable, low-error and calibration-free polarization encoder for free-space quantum communication
• Resource-effective Quantum Key Distribution: a field-trial in Padua city center
• Efficient Optimal Minimum Error Discrimination of Symmetric Quantum States
• Direct measurement of the recovery time of superconducting nanowire single-photon detectors
• Trustworthiness of detectors in quantum key distribution with untrusted detectors
• Cross-encoded quantum key distribution exploiting time-bin and polarization states with qubit-based synchronization
• Security framework for quantum key distribution with imperfect sources
• Hybrid encoder for discrete and continuous variable QKD
• Modular source for near-infrared quantum communication
• In-Field Comparison between G.652 and G.655 Optical Fibers for Polarization-Based Quantum Key Distribution