Wide-spectrum security of quantum key distribution
arXiv:2508.15136 · doi:10.1103/smdh-dcpm
Abstract
Implementations of quantum key distribution (QKD) need vulnerability assessment against loopholes in their optical scheme. Most of the optical attacks involve injecting or receiving extraneous light via the communication channel. An eavesdropper can choose her attack wavelengths arbitrarily within the quantum channel passband to maximise the attack performance, exploiting spectral transparency windows of system components. Here we propose a wide-spectrum security evaluation methodology to achieve full optical spectrum safety for QKD systems. This technique requires transmittance characterisation in a wide spectral band with a high sensitivity. We report a testbench that characterises insertion loss of fiber-optic components in a wide spectral range of 400 to 2300 nm and up to 70 dB dynamic range. To illustrate practical application of the proposed methodology, we give a full Trojan-horse attack analysis for some typical QKD system configurations and discuss briefly induced-photorefraction and detector-backflash attacks. Our methodology can be used for certification of QKD systems.
Corrected funding information; no changes to content. 13 pages, 13 figures, 1 table
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