Essential lack of security proof in quantum key distribution

Abstract

All the currently available unconditional security proofs on quantum key distribution, in particular for the BB84 protocol and its variants including continuous-variable ones, are invalid or incomplete at many points. In this paper we discuss some of the main known problems, particularly those on operational security guarantee and error correction. Most basic are the points that there is no security parameter in such protocols and it is not the case the generated key is perfect with probability $\ge 1-\epsilon$ under the trace distance criterion $d\le \epsilon$, which is widely claimed in the technical and popular literature. The many serious security consequences of this error about the QKD generated key would be explained, including practical ramification on achievable security levels. It will be shown how the error correction problem alone may already defy rigorous quantitative analysis. Various other problems would be touched upon. It is pointed out that rigorous security guarantee of much more efficient quantum cryptosystems may be obtained by abandoning the disturbance-information tradeoff principle and utilizing instead the known KCQ (keyed communication in quantum noise) principle in conjunction with a new DBM (decoy bits method) principle that will be detailed elsewhere.

This paper with a similar title is to be published in the Proceedings of the SPIE Conference on Quantum-Physics-Based Information Security held in Dresden, Germany, Sep 23-24, 2013. This v2 corrects some types in v1

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Cited by in corpus (7)

• On the security of the Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) communicator
• What The Trace Distance Security Criterion in Quantum Key Distribution Does And Does Not Guarantee
• Can Quantum Key Distribution Be Secure
• Random Number Generator Attack against the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise Secure Key Exchange Protocol
• Simple explanation on why QKD keys have not been proved secure
• Security Issues Associated With Error Correction And Privacy Amplification In Quantum Key Distribution
• Nonlinearity Attack against the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) Secure Key Exchange Protocol