Unconditional Security In Quantum Key Distribution

Abstract

It has been widely claimed and believed that many protocols in quantum key distribution, especially the single-photon BB84 protocol, have been proved unconditionally secure at least in principle, for both asymptotic and finite protocols with realistic bit lengths. In this paper it is pointed out that the only known quantitative justification for such claims is based on incorrect assertions. The precise security requirements are described in terms of the attacker's sequence and bit error probabilities in estimating the key. The extent to which such requirements can be met from a proper trace distance criterion is established. The results show that the quantitative security levels obtainable in concrete protocols with ideal devices do not rule out drastic breach of security unless privacy amplification is more properly applied.

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