What kind of noise guarantees security for the Kirchhoff-Loop-Johnson-Noise key exchange?

Abstract

This article is a supplement to our recent one about the analysis of the noise properties in the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) secure key exchange system [Gingl and Mingesz, PLOS ONE 9 (2014) e96109, doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0096109]. Here we use purely mathematical statistical derivations to prove that only normal distribution with special scaling can guarantee security. Our results are in agreement with earlier physical assumptions [Kish, Phys. Lett. A 352 (2006) 178-182, doi: 10.1016/j.physleta.2005.11.062]. Furthermore, we have carried out numerical simulations to show that the communication is clearly unsecure for improper selection of the noise properties. Protection against attacks using time and correlation analysis is not considered in this paper.

References in corpus (4)

• Noise in the wire: the real impact of wire resistance for the Johnson (-like) noise based secure communicator
• Noise properties in the ideal Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise secure communication system
• A classical key distribution system based on Johnson (like) noise - How secure?
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Cited by in corpus (4)

• Elimination of a Second-Law-attack, and all cable-resistance-based attacks, in the Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) secure key exchange system
• Analysis of an attenuator artifact in an experimental attack by Gunn-Allison-Abbott against the Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) secure key exchange system
• Resource requirements and speed versus geometry of unconditionally secure physical key exchanges
• Perspective -- On the thermodynamics of perfect unconditional security