Response to Scheuer-Yariv: "A Classical Key-Distribution System based on Johnson (like) noise -How Secure?"

Abstract

We point out that the claims in the comment-paper of Scheuer and Yariv are either irrelevant or incorrect. The idealized Kirchoff-loop-Johnson-like-noise (KLJN) scheme is totally secure therefore it is more secure than idealized quantum communication schemes which can never be totally secure because of the inherent noise processes in those communication schemes and the statistical nature of eavesdropper detection based on error statistics. On the other hand, with sufficient resources, a practical/non-ideal realization of the KLJN cipher can arbitrarily approach the idealized limit and outperform even the idealized quantum communicator schemes because the non-ideality-effects are determined and controlled by the design. The cable resistance issue analyzed by Scheuer and Yariv is a good example for that because the eavesdropper has insufficient time window to build a sufficient statistics and the actual information leak can be designed. We show that Scheuer's and Yariv's numerical result of 1% voltage drop supports higher security than that of quantum communicators. Moreover, choosing thicker or shorter wires can arbitrarily reduce this voltage drop further; the same conclusion holds even according to the equations of Scheuer and Yariv.

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References in corpus (4)

• Totally Secure Classical Communication Utilizing Johnson (-like) Noise and Kirchoff's Law
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• Totally secure classical networks with multipoint telecloning (teleportation) of classical bits through loops with Johnson-like noise
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• What kind of noise guarantees security for the Kirchhoff-Loop-Johnson-Noise key exchange?
• Comments On "A New Transient Attack On The Kish Key Distribution System"
• Cable Capacitance Attack against the KLJN Secure Key Exchange
• Cracking the Liu key exchange protocol in its most secure state with Lorentzian spectra
• Why wave-based classical communicators can never be totally secure?
• Information theoretic security by the laws of classical physics
• Absolutely Secure Communications by Johnson-like Noise and Kirchhoff's Laws