Optical control of single-photon negative-feedback avalanche diode detector
arXiv:1911.12742 · doi:10.1063/1.5140824
Abstract
We experimentally demonstrate optical control of negative-feedback avalanche diode (NFAD) detectors using bright light. We deterministically generate fake single-photon detections with a better timing precision than normal operation. This could potentially open a security loophole in quantum cryptography systems. We then show how monitoring the photocurrent through the avalanche photodiode can be used to reveal the detector is being blinded.
References in corpus (17)
- Simple Proof of Security of the BB84 Quantum Key Distribution Protocol
- Unconditional Security Of Quantum Key Distribution Over Arbitrarily Long Distances
- Hacking commercial quantum cryptography systems by tailored bright illumination
- Quantum Cryptography with Coherent States
- Quantum Hacking: Experimental demonstration of time-shift attack against practical quantum key distribution systems
- Full-field implementation of a perfect eavesdropper on a quantum cryptography system
- Effects of detector efficiency mismatch on security of quantum cryptosystems
- Trojan-horse attacks threaten the security of practical quantum cryptography
- Controlling passively-quenched single photon detectors by bright light
- Controlling a superconducting nanowire single-photon detector using tailored bright illumination
- Free-running InGaAs single photon detector with 1 dark count per second at 10% efficiency
- Superlinear threshold detectors in quantum cryptography
- Controlling an actively-quenched single photon detector with bright light
- Tailored bright illumination attack on distributed-phase-reference protocols
- Optimised quantum hacking of superconducting nanowire single-photon detectors
- A countermeasure against bright-light attack on superconducting nanowire single-photon detector in quantum key distribution
- Characteristics of superconducting single photon detector in DPS-QKD system under bright illumination blinding attack
Cited by in corpus (10)
- Hacking single-photon avalanche detector in quantum key distribution via pulse illumination
- Preparing a commercial quantum key distribution system for certification against implementation loopholes
- Comments on the "Generalized" KLJN Key Exchanger with Arbitrary Resistors: Power, Impedance, Security
- Deterministic Random Number Generator Attack against the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise Secure Key Exchange Protocol
- AC Loop Current Attacks Against The KLJN Secure Key Exchange Scheme
- Security boundaries of an optical power limiter for protecting quantum key distribution systems
- Perspective -- On the thermodynamics of perfect unconditional security
- Automated verification of countermeasure against detector-control attack in quantum key distribution
- Countermeasure against quantum hacking using detection statistics
- Bright-light detector control emulates the local bounds of Bell-type inequalities