Faking photon number on a transition-edge sensor

Abstract

We study potential security vulnerabilities of a single-photon detector based on superconducting transition-edge sensor. In a simple experiment, we show that an adversary could fake a photon number result at a certain wavelength by sending a larger number of photons at a longer wavelength. In another experiment, we show that the detector can be blinded by bright continuous-wave light and then, a controlled response simulating single-photon detection can be produced by applying a bright light pulse. We model an intercept-and-resend attack on a quantum key distribution system that exploits the latter vulnerability and, under certain assumptions, succeeds to steal the key.

arXiv commentReplacing incorrectly uploaded previous versions. 6 page, 5 figures

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Cited by in corpus (5)

• Protecting fiber-optic quantum key distribution sources against light-injection attacks
• Strong pulse illumination hacks self-differencing avalanche photodiode detectors in a high-speed quantum key distribution system
• Security boundaries of an optical power limiter for protecting quantum key distribution systems
• Quantum key distribution component loopholes in 1500-2100 nm range perspective for Trojan-horse attacks
• Energy-time attack on detectors in quantum key distribution