Secure detection in quantum key distribution by real-time calibration of receiver

Abstract

The single photon detection efficiency of the detector unit is crucial for the security of common quantum key distribution protocols like Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84). A low value for the efficiency indicates a possible eavesdropping attack that exploits the photon receiver's imperfections. We present a method for estimating the detection efficiency, and calculate the corresponding secure key generation rate. The estimation is done by testing gated detectors using a randomly activated photon source inside the receiver unit. This estimate gives a secure rate for any detector with non-unity single photon detection efficiency, both inherit or due to blinding. By adding extra optical components to the receiver, we make sure that the key is extracted from photon states for which our estimate is valid. The result is a quantum key distribution scheme that is secure against any attack that exploits detector imperfections.

7 pages, 4 figures

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• A countermeasure against bright-light attack on superconducting nanowire single-photon detector in quantum key distribution
• Comment on "Inherent security of phase coding quantum key distribution systems against detector blinding attacks" [Laser Phys. Lett. 15, 095203 (2018)]
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• Quantum hacking perceiving for quantum key distribution using temporal ghost imaging
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• Explicit attacks on BB84 with distinguishable photons
• Countering detector manipulation attacks in quantum communication through detector self-testing