Secure detection in quantum key distribution by real-time calibration of receiver
arXiv:1611.07638 · doi:10.1088/2058-9565/aa83c9
Abstract
The single photon detection efficiency of the detector unit is crucial for the security of common quantum key distribution protocols like Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84). A low value for the efficiency indicates a possible eavesdropping attack that exploits the photon receiver's imperfections. We present a method for estimating the detection efficiency, and calculate the corresponding secure key generation rate. The estimation is done by testing gated detectors using a randomly activated photon source inside the receiver unit. This estimate gives a secure rate for any detector with non-unity single photon detection efficiency, both inherit or due to blinding. By adding extra optical components to the receiver, we make sure that the key is extracted from photon states for which our estimate is valid. The result is a quantum key distribution scheme that is secure against any attack that exploits detector imperfections.
arXiv comment7 pages, 4 figures
References in corpus (43)
- Simple Proof of Security of the BB84 Quantum Key Distribution Protocol
- Decoy State Quantum Key Distribution
- Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution
- Quantum Key Distribution with High Loss: Toward Global Secure Communication
- Beating the PNS attack in practical quantum cryptography
- Hacking commercial quantum cryptography systems by tailored bright illumination
- Measurement device independent quantum key distribution over 404 km optical fibre
- Tight Finite-Key Analysis for Quantum Cryptography
- Single photon quantum cryptography
- Device-independent quantum key distribution secure against collective attacks
- Quantum Hacking: Experimental demonstration of time-shift attack against practical quantum key distribution systems
- Quantum Key Distribution over 67 km with a plug & play system
- Full-field implementation of a perfect eavesdropper on a quantum cryptography system
- Effects of detector efficiency mismatch on security of quantum cryptosystems
- Real-world two-photon interference and proof-of-principle quantum key distribution immune to detector attacks
- Experimental demonstration of phase-remapping attack in a practical quantum key distribution system
- Practical free-space quantum key distribution over 1 km
- Device calibration impacts security of quantum key distribution
- Unconditional Security of Practical Quantum Key Distribution
- Attacking practical quantum key distribution system with wavelength dependent beam splitter and multi-wavelength sources
- Quantum Eavesdropping without Interception: An Attack Exploiting the Dead Time of Single Photon Detectors
- Trojan-horse attacks threaten the security of practical quantum cryptography
- Breaking a quantum key distribution system through a timing side channel
- Avoiding the Detector Blinding Attack on Quantum Cryptography
- Laser damage helps the eavesdropper in quantum cryptography
- Controlling a superconducting nanowire single-photon detector using tailored bright illumination
- Practical security bounds against the Trojan-horse attack in quantum key distribution
- The breakdown flash of Silicon Avalance Photodiodes - backdoor for eavesdropper attacks?
- Experimental open air quantum key distribution with a single photon source
- Security loophole in free-space quantum key distribution due to spatial-mode detector-efficiency mismatch
- Resilience of gated avalanche photodiodes against bright illumination attacks in quantum cryptography
- Decoy-state quantum key distribution with a leaky source
- Superlinear threshold detectors in quantum cryptography
- Creation of backdoors in quantum communications via laser damage
- Passive faraday mirror attack in practical two-way quantum key distribution system
- Testing random-detector-efficiency countermeasure in a commercial system reveals a breakable unrealistic assumption
- Reply to "Avoiding the Detector Blinding Attack on Quantum Cryptography"
- Security of quantum key distribution with arbitrary individual imperfections
- Backflash light characterization to prevent QKD zero-error hacking
- Random Variation of Detector Efficiency: A Countermeasure against Detector Blinding Attacks for Quantum Key Distribution
- Optimised quantum hacking of superconducting nanowire single-photon detectors
- Secure gated detection scheme for quantum cryptography
- Comment on "Resilience of gated avalanche photodiodes against bright illumination attacks in quantum cryptography"
Cited by in corpus (13)
- Decoy state quantum key distribution with imperfect source
- Implementation vulnerabilities in general quantum cryptography
- Controlling single-photon detector ID210 with bright light
- Robust countermeasure against detector control attack in practical quantum key distribution system
- Preparing a commercial quantum key distribution system for certification against implementation loopholes
- A countermeasure against bright-light attack on superconducting nanowire single-photon detector in quantum key distribution
- Comment on "Inherent security of phase coding quantum key distribution systems against detector blinding attacks" [Laser Phys. Lett. 15, 095203 (2018)]
- Automated verification of countermeasure against detector-control attack in quantum key distribution
- Intensity modulation as a preemptive measure against blinding of single-photon detectors based on self-differencing cancellation
- Quantum hacking perceiving for quantum key distribution using temporal ghost imaging
- Countermeasure against quantum hacking using detection statistics
- Explicit attacks on BB84 with distinguishable photons
- Countering detector manipulation attacks in quantum communication through detector self-testing