Reply to "Avoiding the Detector Blinding Attack on Quantum Cryptography"
arXiv:1012.0476 · doi:10.1038/nphoton.2010.278
Abstract
This is a reply to the comment by Yuan et al. [arXiv:1009.6130v1] on our publication [arXiv:1008.4593].
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References in corpus (3)
Cited by in corpus (29)
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- Bell nonlocality in networks
- Phase encoding schemes for measurement device independent quantum key distribution and basis-dependent flaw
- Controlling a superconducting nanowire single-photon detector using tailored bright illumination
- Homodyne-detector-blinding attack in continuous-variable quantum key distribution
- Superlinear threshold detectors in quantum cryptography
- Measurement-device-independent quantum cryptography
- Controlling an actively-quenched single photon detector with bright light
- Hacking energy-time entanglement-based systems with classical light
- Critical analysis of the Bennett-Riedel attack on secure cryptographic key distributions via the Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise scheme
- Tailored bright illumination attack on distributed-phase-reference protocols
- Errors and their mitigation at the Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise secure key exchange
- Information theoretically secure, enhanced Johnson noise based key distribution over the smart grid with switched filters
- Current and voltage based bit errors and their combined mitigation for the Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise secure key exchange
- Modeling a measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution system
- Hacking the quantum key distribution system by exploiting the avalanche transition region of single photon detectors
- Comment on "Resilience of gated avalanche photodiodes against bright illumination attacks in quantum cryptography"
- Controlling single-photon detector ID210 with bright light
- Cable Capacitance Attack against the KLJN Secure Key Exchange
- Secure detection in quantum key distribution by real-time calibration of receiver
- Countermeasure against blinding attacks on low-noise detectors with background noise cancellation scheme
- Experimental study of secure quantum key distribution with source and detection imperfections
- Randomized ancillary qubit overcomes detector-control and intercept-resend hacking of quantum key distribution
- Detector blinding attacks on counterfactual quantum key distribution
- Quantum hacking perceiving for quantum key distribution using temporal ghost imaging
- Intrinsic mitigation of the after-gate attack in quantum key distribution through fast-gated delayed detection
- Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution coexisting with classical communication
- Information theoretic security by the laws of classical physics