Measurement-device-independent quantum cryptography
arXiv:1409.5157 · doi:10.1109/JSTQE.2014.2381460
Abstract
In theory, quantum key distribution (QKD) provides information-theoretic security based on the laws of physics. Owing to the imperfections of real-life implementations, however, there is a big gap between the theory and practice of QKD, which has been recently exploited by several quantum hacking activities. To fill this gap, a novel approach, called measurement-device-independent QKD (mdiQKD), has been proposed. It can remove all side-channels from the measurement unit, arguably the most vulnerable part in QKD systems, thus offering a clear avenue towards secure QKD realisations. Here, we review the latest developments in the framework of mdiQKD, together with its assumptions, strengths and weaknesses.
An invited review to the special issue of the IEEE Journal of Selected Topics in Quantum Electronics (JSTQE) on 'Quantum communication and cryptography'
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