Comment on "Inherent security of phase coding quantum key distribution systems against detector blinding attacks" [Laser Phys. Lett. 15, 095203 (2018)]
arXiv:1809.03911 · doi:10.1088/1612-202X/aaf22d
Abstract
This is a brief comment on the Letter by Balygin and his coworkers [Laser Phys. Lett. 15, 095203 (2018)]. We point out an error that invalidates the Letter's conclusions.
2 pages
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- Perspective -- On the thermodynamics of perfect unconditional security