Countering detector manipulation attacks in quantum communication through detector self-testing
arXiv:2204.06155 · doi:10.1063/5.0233772
Abstract
In practical quantum key distribution systems, imperfect physical devices open security loopholes that challenge the core promise of this technology. Apart from various side channels, a vulnerability of single-photon detectors to blinding attacks has been one of the biggest concerns, and has been addressed both by technical means as well as advanced protocols. In this work, we present a countermeasure against such attacks based on self-testing of detectors to confirm their intended operation without relying on specific aspects of their inner working, and to reveal any manipulation attempts. We experimentally demonstrate this countermeasure with a typical InGaAs avalanche photodetector, but the scheme can be easily implemented with any single photon detector.
arXiv comment10 pages, 6 figures
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