Countermeasure against tailored bright illumination attack for DPS-QKD

Abstract

We propose a countermeasure against the so-call tailored bright illumination attacl dor Differential-Phase-Shift QKD (DPS-QKD). By Monitoring a rate of coincidence detection at a pair of superconducting nanowire single photon detectors (SSPDs) which is connected at each of the output ports of Bob's Mach-Zehnder interferometer, Alice and Bob can detect and defeat this kind of attack.

7 pages, 5 figures

References in corpus (5)

• Hacking commercial quantum cryptography systems by tailored bright illumination
• 2-GHz clock quantum key distribution over 260 km of standard telecom fiber
• Avoiding the Detector Blinding Attack on Quantum Cryptography
• Tailored bright illumination attack on distributed-phase-reference protocols
• Secure gated detection scheme for quantum cryptography

Cited by in corpus (9)

• Secure Quantum Key Distribution
• Quantum key distribution over a 72 dB channel loss using ultralow dark count superconducting single-photon detectors
• Hacking Quantum Key Distribution via Injection Locking
• Optimised quantum hacking of superconducting nanowire single-photon detectors
• Controlling single-photon detector ID210 with bright light
• Robust countermeasure against detector control attack in practical quantum key distribution system
• Characteristics of superconducting single photon detector in DPS-QKD system under bright illumination blinding attack
• Countermeasure against quantum hacking using detection statistics
• Countering detector manipulation attacks in quantum communication through detector self-testing