Quantified Effects of the Laser Seeding Attack in Quantum Key Distribution

Abstract

Quantum key distribution (QKD) enables private communications with information-theoretic security. To guarantee the practical security of QKD, it is essential that QKD systems are implemented in accordance to theoretical requirements and robust against side-channel attacks. Here we study a prominent attack on QKD transmitters known as the laser seeding attack (LSA). It consists in injecting photons into the laser of the transmitter in an attempt to modify the outgoing light in some way that is beneficial to the eavesdropper. In this work we measure the response of a QKD transmitter to the LSA as a function of the optical power injected, allowing us to quantify the level of optical attenuation required to mitigate the attack. Further, we employ a laser rate equation model to numerically simulate the effects of the LSA on a gain-switched laser. With this model we are able to reproduce previous experimental results, as well as generate new insight into the LSA by examining the effects of the LSA when the QKD transmitter is operated with different laser current driving parameters.

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Cited by in corpus (4)

• Preparing a commercial quantum key distribution system for certification against implementation loopholes
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• Optical-pumping attack on a quantum key distribution laser source
• Pulsed laser attack at 1061 nm potentially compromises quantum key distribution