Optical-pumping attack on a quantum key distribution laser source
arXiv:2503.11239 · doi:10.1364/OE.562406
Abstract
We report a new type of vulnerability in practical implementations of quantum key distribution systems. We show that it is possible to increase the pulse energy of a source laser diode not only by injection-locking it by external light near its emission wavelength of 1550 nm, but also by optically pumping it at a much shorter wavelength. We demonstrate 10% increase in pulse energy when exposing the laser diode to 1310-nm, 1.6-mW cw laser light via its fiber pigtail. This may allow an eavesdropper to steal the secret key. A possible countermeasure is to install broadband optical filters and isolators at the source's output and characterise them during the security certification.
8 pages, 8 figures, 2 table
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